Epistemology and Reasons

Having Reasons.’  Philosophical Studies 139(1): 57-71, April 2008.

What Does it Take to ‘Have’ a Reason?’  In Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Peterson.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, June 2011.

What Makes Reasons Sufficient?’  American Philosophical Quarterly 52(2): 159-170, April 2015.

Perceptual Reasons and Defeat’  Provisionally forthcoming in a volume on defeat in epistemology.  Posted September 2017.

Epistemology - Knowledge

Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.’  Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume 5, 226-252, February 2015.

Is Knowledge Normative?’  Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues.

In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting.’  Forthcoming in Logos and Episteme.

'Knowledge is Not the Most General Factive Stative Attitude.'  Unpublished manuscript.

'Knowledge is Believing Well.'  Forthcoming in volume on epistemic normativity.  Posted September 2017.


Expression for Expressivists.’  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 86-116, January 2008.  Reprinted in Expressing Our Attitudes.

Synopsis of Being For.’  Analysis Reviews 70(1): 101-104, January 2010.

Getting Noncognitivism Out of the ’Woods.’  Analysis Reviews 70(1): 129-139, January 2010.

Skorupski on Being For.’  Analysis 72(4): 735-739, October 2012.

Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences?’  Philosophical Perspectives 28 (Ethics): 278-290, December 2014.

How Not to Avoid Wishful Thinking.’  In New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael Brady, 126-140.  New York: Palgrave MacMillan, January 2011.

'Convergence in Plan.'  Forthcoming in festschrift for Allan Gibbard.

Frege-Geach Problem

What is the Frege-Geach Problem?’  Philosophy Compass 3/4: 703-720, June 2008.

How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem With Negation.’  Noûs 42(4): 573-599, December 2008.

Higher-Order Attitudes, Frege’s Abyss, and the Truth in Propositions.’  In Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, edited by Robert Johnson and Michael Smith.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 228-245, December 2014.  Reprinted in Expressing Our Attitudes.

'Attitudes and Epistemics.'  In Expressing Our Attitudes.

General Metaethics

'What Matters About Metaethics?'  Forthcoming in Parfit's Defense of Objectivity in Ethics and Practical Reasoning, a volume of new essays on Derek Parfit's On What Matters, to be edited by Peter Singer (forthcoming from Oxford University Press).  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

'Normative Ethics and Metaethics.'  Forthcoming in Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, eds., The Routledge Handbook to Metaethics (forthcoming from Routledge).

'A Common Subject for Ethics.'  Manuscript.

'Willing Belief.'  Forthcoming in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, in a symposium on Bart Streumer's Unbelievable Errors.

History of Ethics

The Hypothetical Imperative?’  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(3): 357-372, September 2005.  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

Cudworth and Normative Explanations.’  Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy,, (2005), vol. 1, no. 3, October 2005.  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

Hybrid Expressivism

Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.’  Ethics 119(2): 257-309, March 2009.  Reprinted in Expressing Our Attitudes.

Tempered Expressivism.’  Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8: 283-314, July 2013.  Reprinted in Expressing Our Attitudes.

The Truth in Hybrid Semantics.’  In Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge.  New York: Oxford University Press, 273-293, October 2014.

Instrumental Rationality

The Scope of Instrumental Reason.’  Philosophical Perspectives 18 (Ethics): 337-364, November 2004.

'Instrumental Mythology.’  Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy,, (2005), symposium 1, December 2005.

Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons.’  Philosophical Studies 143(2): 223-248, March 2009.  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

Scope for Rational Autonomy.’  Philosophical Issues 23: 297-310, August 2013.  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

Hypothetical Imperatives, Scope, and Jurisdiction.’  In Reason, Value, and Respect, edited by Robert Johnson and Mark Timmons.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 89-100, March 2015.  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

Language, other

Showing How to Derive Knowing How.’  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85(3): 746-753, November 2012.

Reversibility or Disagreement.’  With Jake Ross.  Mind 122(1): 43-84, January 2013.

On Losing Disagreements: Spencer and Attitudinal Relativism.’  With Jake Ross.  Forthcoming in Mind.

Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce?’  Noûs 47(3): 409-430, July 2013.  Reprinted in Expressing Our Attitudes.

'Is Semantics Formal?'  In Expressing Our Attitudes.

Metaphysics of Reasons

Reasons and Agent-Neutrality.’  Philosophical Studies 135(2): 279-306, August 2007.  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

The Humean Theory of Reasons.’  Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2: 195-219, April 2007.  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

Précis of Slaves of the Passions.’  Philosophical Studies.  157(3): 432-434, February 2012.

Reply to Shafer-Landau, McPherson, and Dancy.’  Philosophical Studies.  157(3): 463-474, February 2012.

'The Unity of Reasons.'  Forthcoming in Daniel Star, ed., The Oxford Handbook to Reasons and Normativity (forthcoming from Oxford University Press).

Getting Perspective on Objective Reasons.’  Forthcoming in Ethics.  Posted September 2017.

Moral Epistemology

How Does the Good Appear to Us?’  Social Theory and Practice, 34(1): 119-130, January 2008. 

Desiring Under the Proper Guise.’  With Michael Milona.  Provisionally forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics.  Posted September 2017. 

Moral Metaphysics

Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness.’  The Philosophers’ Imprint 5(1):, February 2005.

Huemer’s Clarkeanism.’  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 201-208, January 2009.

Supervenience Arguments Under Relaxed Assumptions.’  With Johannes Schmitt.  Philosophical Studies 155(1): 133-160, August 2011.  Reprinted in Explaining the Reasons We Share.

The Price of Supervenience.’  Published in Explaining the Reasons We Share.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 124-144, May 2014.

Moral Semantics

'Semantics, Moral.'  In the International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette.

Ought, Agents, and Actions.’  Philosophical Review 120(1): 1-41, January 2011.

Philosophy of Language for Metaethics.’  In Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara, eds., Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language.  New York: Routledge, 705-715, March 2012.

‘Attributing Error Without Taking a Stand.’  Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.  Posted September 2017.


A Matter of Principle.’  Joint critical notice of Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, and Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics.  Noûs 43(3): 568-580, September 2009.

Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.’  Noûs 454(2): 328-344, June 2011.

Pragmatic Encroachment

Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.’  Philosophical Studies 160(2): 265-285.  August 2012.

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.’  With Jake Ross.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88(2): 259-288, March 2014.

‘Rational Stability Under Pragmatic Encroachment.’  Forthcoming in Episteme.  Posted September 2017.

The Epistemic Consequences of Forced Choice.’  Short response piece.  Posted September 2014.

Persons, Selves, Relationships

'How Beliefs Wrong.'  Forthcoming in Philosophical Topics.

'Persons as Things.'  Provisionally forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.

Reasons, Weight

Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons.’  Noûs 41(1): 138-160, March 2007.

'Commitment: Worth the Wait.'  With Alida Liberman.  Forthcoming in Errol Lord and Barry Maguire, eds., Weighing Reasons (forthcoming from Oxford University Press, in production).


 How to Be an Expressivist About Truth.’  In New Waves in Truth, edited by Nikolaj Jang Pedersen and Cory Wright, 282-298.  New York: Palgrave MacMillan, September 2010.  Reprinted in Expressing Our Attitudes.

The Moral Truth.’  Forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook to Truth (forthcoming from Oxford University Press, in production) edited by Michael Glanzburg.

'Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals.'  Forthcoming in Meaning Without Representation: Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism (forthcoming from Oxford University Press, in production), edited by Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams.  Reprinted in Expressing Our Attitudes.

Value Theory

Not So Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality.’  Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87(3): 348-356, September 2006.

Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and ‘Good’.’  Ethics 117(2): 265-295, January 2007.

Buck-Passers’ Negative Thesis.’  Philosophical Explorations 12(3): 341-347, July 2009.

Wrong Kind of Reasons

Value and the Right Kind of Reasons.’  Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5: 25-55, August 2010.

The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.’  Ethics 122(3): 457-488, April 2012.

State-Given Reasons: Prevalent, if not Ubiquitous.’  Ethics 124(1): 128-140, October 2013.